It is not uncommon for politicians or media commentators to proclaim various explanations for the root causes of terrorism, mainly focusing on the plight of oppressed people with no other choice. This is easy to believe, as we imagine only desperate people would resort to such desperate measures. Terrorism, we are told, does not discriminate against anyone or anything. It is an equal opportunity killer. Yet academics almost universally disagree. Scholars, such as Pape, Sageman, Krueger and Malackova reject the “downtrodden” theory and take a more macro-approach in analyzing the situation. Furthermore, it is valuable to use real case studies of Hamas terrorists to better understand this problem. If politicians and journalists are wrong when analyzing the causes of terrorism, it could lead to public support of ineffective policies in the attempt to curb terrorism.
As world leaders gathered in Moneterry, Mexico in 2002 to discuss economic development, attributing terrorism to under-development was extremely fashionable. UN General Assembly president Han Seung-Soo called poor countries “the breeding grounds for violence and despair”, while the Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo made a direct link between poverty and terrorism (BBC 1). No leader was surer of himself than George Bush, who called poverty the cause of Islamic fundamentalism and unveiled a 50% increase in foreign aid (1). Rationally, these views make sense. From a strictly economic standpoint, a suicide terrorist values the destruction of his target more than the value of his life. A potential terrorist must have a low value of his life –otherwise the sacrifice of his or her future would be too great.
While there are numerous definitions of the actual word “terrorism,” this paper will only focus on sub-state entities attacking civilians for a political aim. Also, there are many different types of terrorist actions. This paper will narrow the focus to address suicide terrorism. When analyzing this data set, researchers have found absolutely no statistical correlation between the level of development and the number of terrorists. Furthermore, terrorists are usually better educated than the general population and sometimes leave families and promising careers to support their cause (Krueger and Malechova 3). Even 9/11, the most deadly terrorist attack on U.S. soil, cannot be blamed on poverty or lack of education. All 19 hijackers were from middle class families, and most completed college.
Considering that this subject cannot be studied with an emotional bias, there must be other indicators to predict what forces create a terrorist and what makes him or her tick. Pape, Krueger and Maleckova, and Sageman all agree on the dismissal of the “downtrodden” approach but differ in analyzing the underlying roots. According to Pape, suicide terrorism is an effective and logical strategy for fighting a democracy. Suicide terrorists know that their actions, whether or not they cause many casualties, will instill fear in voting citizens. Abdel Karim, former leader of Fatah’s Al Aksa Martyr Brigades, identified suicide attacks as increasing “in Israel so to a point at which Israeli public would demand a withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip” (Pape 5). Suicide terrorism is so damaging to a society’s psyche that it can actually change policy and even ballots.
In addition, suicide attacks are usually the most effective form of terrorism, accounting for only 3% of total attacks and representing 48% of the casualties, without even taking into account September 11th (6). It is much easier to carry out a mission without an escape plan and use one’s person as a weapon. Just like any military strategist, terrorist leaders want to use the most efficient and effective way to complete their mission. When recruits are looking for a way to make a difference, they see the successes resulting from suicide terrorism, including but not limited to U.S. and Frances withdrawal from Lebanon in 1983, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, U.S. military withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, and Sri Lankan acceptance of a Tamil state (Pape 7). Democratic leaders have even admitted to the efficacy of the suicide attack. Yitzchak Rabin defended his decision to make an earlier than agreed upon withdrawal from the West Bank because the alternative would be “to have double the amounts of terror”(Pape 13). Pape does not analyze the psyche of individual terrorists, but he does provide reason as to why educated and financially stable people engage in it: because it is effective. German philosopher Carl von Clausewitz commented, “war is the continuation of politics through other means.” If a group cannot make change politically, it becomes understandable why suicide terrorism is a rational and logical way to institute change.
Pape’s argument does not focus on the experiences that seduce individuals into the realm of suicide terrorism. The term “Islamic extremist” is often used to describe those who are willing to die for their cause. Paul Sageman, a psychologist and ex-CIA case officer, analyzed 400 terrorists who targeted the U.S. The common threads between the terrorists include: coming from intact families (90%), college educated (63%), and married (73%). While these numbers support Pape’s findings, Sageman narrows his theory to focus on why and when this sample became extreme. Since these are members of the upper middle class, they usually travel, study, and live abroad at some point. They tend to get lonely and isolated, which can turn them on to radical ideology. It is after they join the Jihad movement that they become religious (Sageman 4). Surprisingly, there are only 12 mosques around the world that have been found to support 60% of all Jihad fighters (4). Sagemen’s analysis is limited however to Islamic terrorism against the U.S. It would not help explain the Hindu Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the world’s largest suicide terrorist organization.
Krueger and Maleckova compare terrorism to hate crimes and analyze the existing data associated with these acts. Terrorism and hate crimes are similar as both involve an attempt to transcend the physical destruction and influence a group (Krueger and Maleckova 1). There are very few economic indicators that would explain the presence of a hate group within a community, yet the higher the average education, the more likely a U.S. county is to host such a group. Thus Krueger and Maleckova’s statistical analysis falls in line with Pape’s and Sageman’s. Their paper differs however from Sageman’s and puts forth an economic formula to explain the micro level decisions behind Pape’s macro-analysis. The standard model of crime predicts criminal behavior if one’s self worth is lower than the rewards of the crime. As the risk of being caught is lowered, the chances of participation are higher (Krueger and Maleckova 5). Terrorists are more likely to be born in countries with repressive political systems, where an individual’s self-worth is lower than in democracies. Suicide terrorism is hard to prevent and very effective, which makes every variable in the equation in favor of participation (6).
Isolating the actors of one terrorist organization, Hamas, can help to understand the causes. Hamas was established in 1988 during the first Palestinian Intifada. It is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose charter espouses their mission to retake all of Palestine, which includes Israel, Gaza and the West Bank (MIPT 1). Hamas has two different wings; terrorist and political. Both are extremely successful. The political faction recently defeated Arafat’s Fatah party in the Gaza Strip, which gave them complete political control of the territory. The terrorist wing has also been very active, instituting 581 attacks since their inception resulting in 603 deaths and almost 3000 injuries, 85% of whom are private citizens (1). Since their covenant is based on reclaiming Israel from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, many Israelis cannot find a distinct separation between their political and terrorist wings (Herzog 85).
Since the 1993 Oslo accords, peace between the Israelis and Palestinians has become increasingly tangible. Hamas however has played a spoiler role in the peace process by opting to attack mainly around Israeli election and peace conferences (Bloom 62). Accepting a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would relinquish Palestinian claims for the rest of Israel, thus undermining Hamas’s main goal. Even so, support for armed attacks against Israelis is extremely high in the Palestinian Territories, ranging from 74% to 90% depending on the subgroup (Krueger and Maleckova 2). Sixty percent of Palestinians feel that these attacks have actually led to Israeli concessions (3). Hamas, the foremost terrorist organization representing the Palestinian people, must have this broad range of support to continue its attacks.
Hamas has no problem finding suicide bombers. According to a senior member of Hamas, there are “so many [who] wish to embark on this journey of honor […] when one is selected, countless others are disappointed” (Krueger and Maleckova 5). The reasons for opting to become a terrorists can be broken up into three components; religious, personal, and nationalist (Moghadam 69). Part of the recruitment process is deciding whether the subject can be convinced that a suicide mission is a religious act. Most recruits believe that the West, which includes Israel and the United States, are trying to suppress Islam. They believe the only way to defend against the outside powers is to embark on the path of Jihad (70). The influence of Islam also allows the attackers’ death to be celebrated and glorified. Fake weddings are sometimes held for the dead terrorist and his new brides, including the “black-eyed virgins” who greet them in heaven (73).
Personal considerations are also taken into account when making the decision to become a suicide bomber. These individuals are usually the most talented members of their societies, yet were born into an environment where they cannot thrive. Plato even warned in The Republic of a society where talented people are not able to improve their situation (Moghaddam 163). Palestinians born in the territories are almost guaranteed a life of poverty. The infant mortality rate is 23% in 2005 compared with Israel’s 6%, and per capita GDP is $1,107 compared with Israel’s $17,828 (Human Development Report 1). The Palestinian economy has been almost stagnant in the last 30 years while Israel’s has experienced considerable growth. The best way for a Palestinian to improve his/her family income is to carry out a suicide attack on Israelis for which Hamas and other third parties guarantee payments.
Ismail al-Massawabi killed two Israeli sergeants in a suicide attack in 2001. His family moved from a decrepit refugee camp into a spacious and new Gaza apartment (Moghadam 72). Private Saudi citizens and other parties also sometimes share in the burden of compensating the family (72). Not only do suicide bombers provide their family with monetary support, they are deified through posters and videotapes. It is as if they rise in status only after death, since it is impossible to do so in life. Although statistics point to terrorists being more financially stable than their civilian peers, the bar is set very low in the Palestinian territories. Low social mobility allows for the best and brightest to seek a non-traditional method of success, terrorism.
Revenge is also a key factor in the causes of terrorism. As stated before, the Palestinian economic situation is bleak, and every citizen has first hand experience with the Israeli occupation. Hamas leaders insist that revenge alone is not enough to seek martyrdom, and they make sure that recruits have other reasons. (Hassan 41). Yet, many suicide bombers join after family members or friends have been killed in clashes with Israelis, which makes it impossible to dismiss revenge as a cause of terrorism (Moghadam 73). The education system might have a large role in promoting revenge as it encourages “rigid, us-versus-them thinking” (Moghaddam 164).
Nationalist goals also play a role in Hamas’s appeal to suicide terrorists. Hamas was created in the backdrop of the first Intifada, which was a reaction against the Israeli occupation. Without messages of violence, Israelis would have no reason to give up any land to the Palestinians. Suicide bomber Muhammad Hazza al-Ghoul quoted, “how beautiful for splinters of my bones to be the response that blows up the enemy, not for the love of killing, but so we can live as other people” (Hafez 47). This individual views himself as representing his people just as an elected politician does in a democracy.
The terrorist attacks have increased the bargaining position of the Palestinians. A representative of Islamic Jihad, another Palestinian terrorist organization, quoted “our Jihad action has exposed the enemy weakness, confusion and hysteria” (Pape 13). A Hamas political bureau chief abroad commented that since the institution of suicide terrorism during the second Intifada, the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli deaths was reduced from 5 to 1 down to 1.7 to 1 (Hafez 26). Suicide bombings have allowed Palestinians to fight a much stronger and modern army using asymmetrical tactics.
Hamas’s actions have led to Israeli concessions, such as the hasty withdrawal from many West Bank towns (Pape 14). Calls to retake the homeland are rampant, and even recently Hama’s leading figure quoted that “some Israelis think that when we talk of the West Bank and Gaza it means we have given up our historic war […] this is not the case” (Herzog 88). Palestinian youths are taught from day one that the year 1948 was a nakba, Arabic for catastrophe. It is imperative to fight for the homeland to retake what the Zionists have stolen (Moghadam 74). Economic motives, personal motives, and nationalism all play an equal role in the steady supply of Palestinians willing to die for their cause.
Using Hamas as the example, it is evident that a sense of helplessness inspires individuals to join the group. The Jordanians or Israelis have occupied the Palestinians since 1948 with no political end in sight. Their regime, whether it domestic or Israeli, is extremely repressive and does not allow for the free flow of ideas. Social mobility is zero, and the only way for a Palestinian to gain recognition is to become a martyr.
Using this example, Pape as well as Krueger and Maleckova, provide good explanations for the causes of terrorism, although with a few holes in their arguments. Krueger and Maleckova argue that when comparing terrorism to hate crimes, there was no correlation between economic deprivation and presence of hate organizations. Hamas definitely benefits from the economic deprivation of the average Palestinian. Perhaps, in this regard, hate crimes are not analogous to a Palestinian’s journey to martyrdom. The ultimate purpose for both acts is persuasion, but Klu Klux Klan members act on the motive of only bigotry, while Palestinians use it together with personal motives, nationalist and religious goals. The notion that political repression is positively correlated with the incidence of terrorists is consistent with the Palestinian case study. Palestinian youths are not given the opportunity to express their views politically or better their economic situation, leading them to find destructive alternatives.
Pape also gives solid testimony that corroborates with Hamas’s logic. Attacks perpetrated by Hamas have been extremely effective from a military standpoint. This has led to modest political concessions from the Israelis, but not a full withdrawal. Even though Hamas is a democratically elected representation of 1.3 million Gaza residents, Israel, along with much of the international community, does not recognize them—
mainly because of their use of suicide terrorism (Herzog 85). Pape notes that suicide terrorism is usually able to attain modest goals, but states will stop short of abandoning their policies to appease the terrorists. Rather, populations will learn to defend against it and live with certain amounts of wariness, similar to how the Israelis have learned to live. (Pape 15).
Academics have written extensively about the causes of terrorism and how many politicians are completely misguided. Much of the literature has argued that increased foreign aid and democratization policies would not help curb terrorism since terrorists are usually upper middle class families and democracies in the Arab world could turn anti-American. The Hamas case study could refute both of these findings since economic stagnation and political repression are some of the main causes of terrorism. These however are all linked to the forty-year Israeli occupation and domestic PLO corruption, and the Palestinians spoke loud and clear when electing Hamas in 2006. As the Palestinian economic situation gets better, support for suicide terrorist attacks will go down. As social mobility in the territories improves, fewer youths will find success only in death. Restructuring must begin from the inside, with the help of the world community, to make opportunities that favor life, rather than death.
Works Cited
Bloom, Mia. "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding." Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004).
Hafez, Mohammed M. Manufacturing Human Bombs: the Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006.
"Hamas: Group Profile." MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database. Rand Corporation. 12 Dec. 2007
Hassan, Nasra. "An Arsenal of Believers." The New Yorker 19 Nov. 2001. 12 Dec. 2007
Herzog, Michael. "Can Hamas Be Tamed?" Foreign Affairs (2006).
"Human Development Report." United Nations Development Programme. United Nations. 12 Dec. 2007
Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. "Seeking the Roots of Terrorism." The Chronical of Higher Education (2003).
Moghadam, Assaf. "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2003).
Moghaddam, Fathali M. From the Terrorists' Point of View. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006.
Moghaddam, Fathali M. "Staircase to Terrorism." American Psychologist (2005).
Murphy, Cait. "The Poverty/Terrorism Myth." CNN 13 Mar. 2007. 12 Dec. 2007
Pape, Robert A. "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism." American Political Science Review 97 (2003).
Sageman, Marc. "Understanding Terror Networks." Foreign Policy Research Institute (2004).
